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Abstract
This paper focuses on the policies and politics associated with Thai occupied forest areas, and
identifies noteworthy aspects of both as they emerged in the 1990s. Furthermore, we confirm the
fundamental principles related to the most notable aspect, in particular, that emerged under
democratization in the decade. To identify these noteworthy aspects, we make use of the con-
cept, “territorialization,” and adopt a polyarchical perspective for the purpose of describing policy
evolution and political structures, respectively, while modifying both. As well as discussing those
stages of “territorialization” that Vandergeest has previously presented in relation to Thai forests,
this study describes policy processes that we have termed the deterritorialization and reverse
territorialization of forests. With respect to the polyarchical perspective, we have noticed certain
changes in the political structure. Thai occupied forest area policy in the 1990s evolved by
traversing two conflicting policy directions dynamically. Behind this evolution are the political
structures associated with the re-establishment of absolute power by the military and the estab-
lishment of a democratic political regime. In addition, it is especially notable that two opposing
policy directions emerged within a continuing democratic regime. This suggests that the demo-
cratic political regime, in itself, does not necessarily guarantee a particular position in Thai occu-
pied forest area policy, and that occupied forest area politics under a democratic political regime
have developed structures of competition and conflict that are consistent with the political regime,
in response to policy evolution.
Keywords: Thailand, occupied forest area, policy and politics, the 1990s, democratization, con-
frontation
I Introduction
In August 2000, Thai national television broadcast a special program entitled “The Public
Stage.” The program covered controversial issues, such as policy regarding the use of occupied
forest areas, and featured open discussion between government representatives and the
Assembly of the Poor (Samacha Khon Jon or So Kho Jo), one of the most famous organizations
of people and farmers in Thailand. For many viewers, the program probably conveyed two
ideas: first, that the democratization of Thailand had progressed, and second, that a number of
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rural problems, highlighted by residence and/or farming inside protected forest areas,
remained.
An impressive aspect of the live broadcast was the style of the debate. Deputy Ministers,
top-ranking officers of related departments, and representatives of private organizations sat side
by side and had equal time and opportunity to express their views. Although the debate ran
smoothly, the discussion revealed sharp contrasts among the participants. For instance, the
Director-General of the Royal Forestry Department (RFD), the Deputy Minister of Agriculture,
and the leader of a lowland farmers’ organization from northern Thailand (who sat on the
authority side, on stage) justified the policy set out in a 1998 cabinet resolution, contending that
forest areas do not exist for a segment of farmers, but rather for the entire nation. By contrast,
the So Kho Jo (SKJ) accused their rivals of promoting a policy that was expedient to their own
interests.
Hirsch has noted that, “The environment is political as it concerns the allocation of
resources” [Hirsch 1994: 5]. This idea is relevant to the Thai forest problem, especially with
respect to occupied land uses or overlapping land uses inside forest areas; indeed, Hirsch
considered the issue from that perspective [see Hirsch 1990]. The initial analyses of problems
in Thailand, which emphasized this kind of political (or political economic) perspective, were
those of Hirsch and Tasaka. Hirsch outlined the triumvirate of interests concerned with forest
reserve areas as the state (the RFD, the Department of Land), capitalists, and labor (peasant
smallholders). He also emphasized that the relationships between each set of actors were
structured by axes of both conflict and common interest, and that since each group of
interested parties consisted of a heterogeneous set of actors, commonality and conflict of
interest were internal as well as external [ibid.]. Tasaka focused attention on the conflicting
aspects of the various stakeholders [Tasaka 1992]. Subsequently, other studies have cited the
politics of Thai forest areas, either directly or indirectly, emphasizing an historical perspective,
especially with respect to policies. Vandergeest focused on how the government has used
increasingly intricate territorial strategies to claim resources and control human activities in that
part of the national territory defined as forest, emphasizing that the “territorialization” process
has taken place in three stages [Vandergeest 1996]. He also pointed out that local
noncompliance and inter-bureaucratic competition had rendered laws for bringing these
strategies into practice unenforceable. Sato noted the space between the boundaries of
farmland and forest frontiers, and confirmed that multiple social interests have affected the
mechanism by which such spaces have been created [Sato 2002].
Undoubtedly, such thought-provoking studies have increased our understanding of Thai
forest area politics and policies. However, such studies have not described the evolution
sufficiently to discern the process that led to the conflicting structure seen in “The Public
Stage” in 2000. It may be said that, primarily, studies other than Sato’s were too early to
consider the entire process of policy and political evolution in the 1990s. Even Sato’s broad
study of events, which include those of the 1990s, makes relatively little mention of occupied
forest area politics in the 1990s, as it offers more comprehensive and systematic policy
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descriptions. In short, few studies have clarified the evolution of both the policy and politics
related to occupied forest areas throughout the 1990s, the period when Thailand entered an era
of unprecedented full-scale democratization that has led to the current political regime, despite
the interaction between the two.
Several other studies have touched on Thai occupied forest area policy and politics in the
1990s. Of particular importance were studies that focused on policy and politics from the
perspective of clarifying the respective backgrounds of farmers’ and peoples’ movements. Some
of these studies included detailed statements of facts related to forest area problems in the
1990s [e.g., Pintobtang 1998; Kaiyoorawongs et al. 2002]. However, they primarily analyzed and
evaluated the development and political significance of the farmers’ and peoples’ movements,
not the overall forest area policies and politics themselves.
This paper focuses on the evolution of policy and politics pertaining to Thai forest areas,
especially occupied lands within forest areas. It focuses on the 1990s, a decade characterized by
democratization after a short period of military rule, but also briefly describes the evolution that
occurred earlier. More specifically, we examine policies (mainly cabinet resolutions) and
stakeholder actions related to those policies, and identify noteworthy aspects of their
evolution. In addition, we confirm the fundamental principles associated with the most notable
aspect that emerged under democratization in the 1990s.
To identify the noteworthy aspects of policy and politics pertaining to Thai occupied forest
areas in the 1990s, we develop frameworks for analysis from Vandergeest’s concept of
“territorialization” and Hirsch’s polyarchical (triumvirate) perspective. Both are modified to a
large degree, to cover policy evolution and to follow political structures, respectively. According
to Vandergeest, in Thailand, “territorialization” took place in three stages. The first stage
involved the declaration that all unoccupied land within the national boundary was state forest
under the jurisdiction of the RFD. The second involved the mapping of forests into reserved
and permanent forests. The third involved “functional territorialization,” such as reclassifying
reserved forest into zones, classifying watersheds, and establishing other protected forest
designations. This study adds two other stages, in addition to those posited by Vandergeest,
that run counter to the direction of the three stages noted above, in order to emphasize
different policy trends: the deterritorialization of forests (the substantial revocation of forest
demarcation) and reverse territorialization of forests (the downgrading of a forest designation,
for example, from protected forest to national reserved forest). On the other hand, the most
important point of Hirsch’s previously mentioned study is that it broadly examined the multiple
interests involved in Thai forest areas; it outlined the actors involved and the complicated
relationships of interests as a comprehensive structure figure. By contrast, our study outlines
the often-shifting political structures related to occupied forest area policy. In particular, we
note some symbolic changes, as mediated in the composition of the actors, the power
relationships among the actors, and their stances on policy.
This study traces the actions of politicians, bureaucratic institutions, private organizations
(such as farmers’ organizations and NGOs), political parties, and some cabinets. Policy
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examination is limited to those policies that address the problems associated with overlapping
land use in forest areas (particularly, private and agricultural land use within national reserved
forest areas and protected forest areas).1) Although the community forest issue constitutes the
other important axis of Thai forest politics during the 1990s, we barely touch on that topic here,
given that this topic requires the consideration of different structures. In the next section, we
first present a noteworthy aspect of the 1980s. Then, noteworthy events in the 1990s are
presented in the three subsequent sections, each of which focuses on a particular phase of
policy and politics.
II Partial Deterritorialization Policy in the 1980s and
Competition among Political Elites
In 1990, the Thai Ministry of the Interior (MOI) organized a special project2) and surveyed the
overlapping land use situation inside forest areas nationwide. According to the survey, more
than 22% of the area of Thailand’s 1,285 national reserved forests and national parks (total area =
158 million rai)3) was being used for other purposes, such as farming. Moreover, approximately
one million households, or more than five million people (about 9% of the entire Thai population
at the time), were living in reserved forest and national park areas [KT 17/8/1990; Than
Sethakit 10/12/1990].
The results may not have surprised many, since overlapping forest area uses were well
known in Thailand even before this survey. The process leading to the survey was more
noteworthy than the results. In particular, the MOI survey highlighted the evolution of
stakeholder competition that had emerged in the period before the survey. In this section, we
review the process of competition for policy in the mid-1980s that led to the survey in 1990, and
present a noteworthy structural aspect of the competition for occupied forest area policy
formation and implementation in the 1980s.
Specifically, the central policy in the mid-1980s was the 1985 February policy resolution.
This policy resolution, in part, invoked the deterritorialization of forests. It is noteworthy that
this resolution generated several conflicts among Congress members, ministers, and
bureaucratic institutions. Compared with policy evolution in the 1990s, that associated with the
resolution in the mid-1980s suggests that changes in policy related to occupied forest areas
involved battles between political elites, in the context of a balanced power relationship.
1) Here, the term “forest area” (khet pa) covers a range of forest area types. It refers mainly to “national
reserved forest areas” and “protected forest areas.” For details on the characteristics of protected
forest areas, see Section III of this article. The term forest area sometimes encompasses “permanent
forest areas.” Normally, forest area designations in Thailand are defined and fall within the following
regulatory hierarchy (from the least to the most strictly regulated): permanent forest areas, national
reserved forest areas, and protected forest areas.
2) The project title was “The Project of the Survey of Government Offices, People’s Houses and
Livelihood Lands, and Roads inside National Reserved Forest Areas, Lands Classified as Permanent
Forest Areas, and Public Use Areas.”
3) 1 rai = 0.16 ha. The total area of Thailand is about 320 million rai.
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Policies before the mid-1980s and Processes Leading to the February 1985 Cabinet Resolution
Clause 14 of the original 1964 National Reserved Forests Act, which legitimized most of the
national reserved forest areas in Thailand, contained the following regulation: “Inside the
territory of national reserved forests, all persons are prohibited from taking hold of or
occupying land, clearing land . . .” [Weowuthinan 1977: 447]. In national reserved forest areas
across Thailand, however, the actual situation that developed in the 1960s and 1970s differed
greatly from that stipulated in the regulations. For instance, the RFD estimated that about one
million households already illegally resided in and cultivated forest areas in the late 1970s [see
Sabbhasri 1985: 16].
Although overlapping land use inside forest areas was widespread in this early period, the
government had not always ignored the problem. It had attempted to regulate the problem
under policy frameworks several times. For instance, typical policies before the 1990s included
the Agricultural Land Reform, the Forest Village Project (FVP), the So To Ko (STK), and the
February 1985 cabinet resolution. However, these policies often generated competition among
stakeholders, either directly or indirectly, and some policies were established in the wake of
such competition. The February 1985 cabinet policy resolution was just such a case.
In the mid-1970s, the Thai government promulgated two similar policies: the Agricultural
Land Reform and the FVP. Both policies fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC). However, the departments that managed the two were
different: the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) and the RFD, respectively.
Agricultural land reform in Thailand had two broadly categorized methods of implemen-
tation. The ALRO took private land from large-scale landowners and allocated it to landless or
small-scale farmers; in addition, the ALRO issued certificates, putting a ceiling of 50 rai per
family, to occupying farmers inside state lands, and then formally confirmed the occupied lands
as farmland. The former land reform method was applied to very small areas in Thailand. The
latter method has been implemented actively on a large-scale since the 1990s, especially in
national reserved forest areas. However, the implementation was slow during the 1970s and
1980s.
Two main factors account for the slow start. First, the general political situation changed,
culminating in the 1976 military coup. The 1973 Student Revolution and subsequent periodic
farmers’ movements prompted the creation of the Agricultural Land Reform Act. However,
the Tanin government that took power after the military coup adopted strict anti-communist
policies and arrested leaders of the farmers’ movements [see Suehiro 1980: 156]. This political
transition cast a shadow over land reform movements. The second factor related to the FVP
and the STK, “The Project to Assist People to Obtain Land Use Rights” (khrongkan chuai lua
rasadon hai mi sitthi thamkin), which took over some parts of the FVP. In particular, in the
1980s, the STK was seen as the main remedy for the problems inside national reserved forest
areas.
During the 1970s, the Agricultural Land Reform policy was applied in only 3,220 cases (or
households) [see Chaimangkhara 1998]. The FVP also remained dormant during this time [see
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Chuntanaparb and Wood 1986: 32–40]. Budget and security problems in forest regions
contributed to slowing the implementation of the FVP [see ibid.: 28; Sabbhasri 1985: 16].
Although the principal purpose of the FVP was to recover and protect forests, the project
also functioned as an adjustment policy for overlapping farmlands inside forest areas. For
instance, the project lent lands for making a living, putting a ceiling of 15 rai per family, to
occupying farmers under the control of the RFD, in new plots, while the RFD expropriated
some farmlands scattered inside forest areas. However, the projects were enormously
expensive, as they involved infrastructure improvements and tree-planting operations,
employing villagers in and around the newly constructed forest villages, and not simply land
readjustment alone. In addition, until the early 1980s, communist guerrillas still clung to their
outposts in backwoods regions, so the security situation was unstable.
Once security began to be restored, the RFD developed the STK, which was specifically
intended to remedy the cost problems associated with the FVP. The STK cut infrastructure
improvements and tree-planting operations initiated by the FVP, and limited the granting of
land-use rights (STK land usufruct certificates),4) setting a ceiling of 15 rai per family, to
occupying farmers. Like the FVP, the STK maintained the territorial status of national reserved
forests (and, likewise, RFD jurisdiction).
The support of the World Bank helped ensure that the STK had a sufficient budget. After
fiscal 1982, a wide range of policy-guided activities moved forward and seemed to progress
smoothly for a time. In the mid-1980s, however, some Congress members requested policy
changes. These members sought to revoke reserved forest designations and issue land
ownership documents to people who resided and made their living in some national reserved
forest areas [see ks 0705(3)/12051 21/5/1984; Kaiyoorawongs 1995: 76–77]. As a result, “The
Project to Revoke the State of Forests in Places with Established Communities” (khrongkan
phukthon saphap pa thi pen thi tang chumchon) was approved at a February 1985 cabinet
meeting, although the RFD did not welcome the new policy [see ks 0705(3)/12051 21/5/1984].
The February 1985 Cabinet Resolution Policy and Competition between Political Elites
Two proceedings guided projects in accordance with the February 1985 Cabinet Resolution.
First, community places that overlapped with national reserved forest areas were divided into
three groups: (1) places established before 1967, as confirmed by aerial photographs and
military maps, (2) places established between 1967 and 1975, and (3) places established
between 1975 and 1981. Second, the resolution gave rights through (1) land title deeds based
on the Land Code, (2) STK certificates, and (3) permission for temporary residence and use
4) The STK certificates issued by the RFD were officially non-transferable, except through inheritance,
and were not acceptable as loan collateral [Onchan 1990: 68]. In addition, some rights related to land,
as already mentioned or to be mentioned below, had the following characteristics. Agricultural land
reform certificates (SPK4-01) issued by the ALRO were officially non-transferable, except through
inheritance or to Farmer’s co-operatives or the ALRO. Land use rights and land title deeds issued by
the Department of Land (DOL) according to the Land Code were transferable, except in the case of
non-transferable restrictions, and could be accepted as loan collateral [ibid.].
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[see ks 0705(3)/1686 21/1/1985].
The concept of “territorialization” is applied not only to forest but also to a broader
coverage [see Vandergeest and Peluso 1995]. In this study, however, the term is limited to
forests, as in Vandergeest’s study, noted in the Introduction [Vandergeest 1996]. Based on this
assumption, the policy for category (1) places, in those policies under the above resolution, was
a policy that we consider represented the deterritorialization of forests, as the places indicated
would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the RFD and would be excluded from forest
territories. In addition, we characterize the substantial shift from designated forest areas to
agricultural land reform areas as a form of deterritorialization policy,5) for the same reason.
Requests by Congress members seeking solutions to overlapping land use problems, not
only through RFD management and the issuance of STK certificates, but also through the
revocation of forest designations and the issuance of land titles, sparked the policy change. If
the project had been successful, some of the occupied lands inside national reserved forest
areas would have changed from being forest areas controlled by the RFD to private lands under
the jurisdiction of the DOL (under the MOI).6) However, delays and changes in actual project
implementation, especially for category (1) places, occurred after cabinet approval in February
1985. For instance, in 1987, the National Economic and Social Development Board under the
Prime Minister’s Office called on the RFD to restructure the policy [see Thailand, Krom Pamai
1993: 4–5]. In March 1989, Minister of Agriculture Sanan made a motion to change part of the
project [see nr 0202/4474 30/3/1989].
Although these events, following the February 1985 resolution, may have seemed
regressive to some Congress members and the MOI or DOL,7) Deputy Interior Minister Sanoh
organized a special survey project in 1990 to clarify the overlapping land use situation
nationwide. The MOI (and DOL) presented the following summary when it established a
committee for the survey project: the RFD has endeavored to solve the problem of overlapping
land use inside forest areas; however, it has not satisfied the wishes of the people. Therefore,
the MOI has to look into how to assist the RFD by obtaining fundamental data. The document
also addressed a plan for the committee to examine whether to revoke some overlapping lands
after the survey, and then to submit the results to the cabinet for consideration [see mt 0712/
2362 12/2/1990].
According to Tasaka [1992: 13], there were conflicting views within the Thai government as
to whether “it should confer full property rights to settlers” inside forest areas, or whether “it
5) Vandergeest and Peluso characterized “the degazetting of some forest reserve for land reform” as “a
more conciliatory approach to most ‘forest’ settlers” [Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 414].
6) The RFD itself estimated the category (1) areas in the February 1985 resolution to cover
approximately 10 million rai (4,355 community places) in the late 1980s [see Thailand, Krom Pamai
1993: 7–8].
7) The Special Committee for Examining Problems of National Reserved Forests, which was established
by Congress in 1988, proposed re-promoting the February 1985 resolution [see House of
Representatives (Sapha Phuthen Rasadon) 2357/2531 17/10/1988]. In 1990, Deputy Interior Minister
Sanoh stated his intention to make key points of the February 1985 resolution part of MOI policy
[Matichon 19/10/1990].
KURASHIMA and JAMROENPRUCKSA: Policy and Politics Related to Thai Occupied Forest Areas in the 1990s
83
should confine itself to giving limited usufruct rights because property rights could ultimately
be taken over by capitalists.” The evolution of the adjustment policies for occupied land use
inside forest areas, particularly that involving the February 1985 resolution, represented the
conflicting views and interests of the political elite, including ministers, bureaucratic institutions,
and some Congress members. Moreover, the repeated twists of this evolution suggested,
paradoxically, that the power relationship among stakeholders was relatively balanced.
III Largest-ever Functional Territorialization Policy in the Early 1990s
and a Resurgence of Military Influence
As set out in the Introduction, this paper seeks to clarify the evolution of policies and politics
pertaining to Thai occupied forest areas in the 1990s, a decade characterized by an
unprecedented full-scale democratization of Thailand, following a short period of military
rule. This assumes that occupied forest area issues cannot be separated from changes in the
general political situation in Thailand, and that related policies evolved under the influence of
the general situation.
The parallel relationship between the development of general politics and the evolution of
issues relevant to occupied forest areas in the 1980s was confirmed. For instance, the Thai
political regime under the Prem government, which ruled for most of the 1980s, was often
defined as a “half-democracy” regime. A general feature of this regime was that farmers had
little opportunity to provide input on policy decisions and were discouraged from establishing
independent organizations [see Asami 2002: 47]. This also applied to the politics related to
occupied forest area policy, as symbolized by the evolution discussed in the last section,
although there were some exceptions.
In addition, an extreme form of such a parallel relationship appeared during the early
1990s, when the military seized political power. At the time, the military considered occupied
forest area issues on a large scale. This resulted in the formation and implementation of the
Military Land Redistribution Program or the so-called Kho Jo Ko (KJK), which we regard as the
most ambitious attempt to implement the functional territorialization of forests.
Military Land Redistribution Program and Zoning by the RFD
The principal features of the KJK, “The Farmland Allotment Program for the Poor Living in
Degraded Reserved Forest Areas,” which was approved in 1990, were as follows: first, the
project divided the entire territory of national reserved forest into zones and regulated land-use
methods in accordance with principles set for each zone. Next, the authorities tried to enforce
the zoning and land-use methods by force. More specifically, the authorities allowed the
occupying farmers less than 15 rai of land per family only in specified plots, and relocated
occupying farmers who stayed inside and around protected forest zones to the specified plots,
regardless of when their settlements were established. The authorities also tried to expropriate
extra land from occupying farmers inside non-protected forest zones of national reserved forest
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areas, if the farmer occupied more than a defined land area per family. Furthermore, the
projects involved the lease of lands that the authorities acquired in this manner to private
companies for tree plantations [see Techaatik 1992].
These aspects of the KJK overrode some features of the FVP. Forest villages were divided
into types of project, such as King’s projects, security projects, and normal projects [see Takeda
1990: 13]. Of these projects, security projects were originally run by the military. In this sense,
the KJK was not a brand new project. Nevertheless, the KJK differed markedly from the
FVP. One point to note is that the KJK implemented wide-ranging zoning of national reserved
forest areas, although the RFD, not the military, regulated such zoning. This zoning can be
regarded as the functional territorialization of forests.
The zoning arrangements and principles were finally approved in March 1992.
Countrywide, zoning divided 147 million rai of national reserved forest area into three
categories: (1) forest zones for protection (Zone C), covering about 88 million rai, (2) forest
zones for economic uses (Zone E), covering about 52 million rai, and (3) forest zones suitable
for agriculture (Zone A), covering about 7 million rai. Zone C consisted mainly of “protected
forest areas according to acts or cabinet resolutions,” such as wildlife sanctuaries, national
parks, and Class 1 watersheds. The basic principle of this zone was the protection of natural
forests. Farming and dwellings were prohibited. Zone E consisted of forestry plantations,
community forestry lands, and lands for projects such as the FVP. Zone A encompassed areas
to be transferred to the ALRO [see Thailand, Krom Pamai 1992: 15–43].
We call the functional territorialization policy of the early 1990s the “largest-ever” functional
territorialization of forests because it was the broadest-scale remapping of national reserved
forests, despite the fact that only a small part was used for land reform. The KJK was intended
to be a gargantuan-scale project. The policy was first implemented in the northeast and was
planned to cover the entire country, ultimately targeting 970,000 households [see Techaatik
1992].
Evolution of the Military Land Redistribution Program and Political Leverage of the Military
The main feature of the KJK was that it was intended to work on a large scale. Its large-scale
nature raised a key question. How could such a huge project be enacted and implemented in
national reserved forest areas where the RFD, DOL (MOI), ministers, and other political elites
had intertwining interests?
To answer this, we will mention only key points. The most crucial reason was that the KJK
was a project run by the military. The participation of the military, who rebuilt a very strong
political power base at the time, in the politics of occupied forest area policy changed the
balance of power among the political elite drastically. Moreover, with respect to the KJK, the
military shared some interests and ideas with the RFD, which also allowed the relatively rapid
implementation of the KJK.
Despite being able to enact and implement the KJK rapidly, the power of the military
evaporated soon after the KJK was implemented. The so-called May Event in 1992 forced the
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military to withdraw from the main political stage. This, in itself, did not halt the KJK
immediately. Farmers’ demonstrations also affected the decision. Nevertheless, as a result, the
1992 May Event had a great influence on stopping the KJK.
The profile of the military project from beginning to cancellation can be roughly
summarized as follows. In 1991, the KJK was implemented in parts of the northeast. However,
poor planning and coercive enforcement quickly raised objections from the farmers affected. By
September 1991, farmers and other opposition groups had organized protests. Protests followed
in other places, and some groups linked up via student- or NGO-led seminars. The famous
Mittaphap Road March in June 1992, after the May Event, marked a critical point. About 4,500
protesters jammed the highway running northeast from Bangkok to protest the KJK. As a
result of this protest, the caretaker government of the day met to negotiate with opposition
groups, and decided to cancel the KJK.
IV Deterritorialization and Reverse Territorialization Policies in the 1990s,
and the Impact of Democratization
The May Event in 1992 is considered an epoch-making event in Thai political history. In this
event, the political hegemony of the military was ended conclusively, and a transition to
democratic polity was ensured. However, this transition did not mean that competition and
conflict disappeared; the period was characterized by an increased number of demonstrations
by the people and repeated government changes. Apart from a very short period in the mid-
1970s, this situation had not arisen in Thailand previously. Nevertheless, such demonstrations
and government changes became frequent occurrences after 1992. The next two sections cover
the evolution of occupied forest area issues in the era of democratization in Thailand. In
particular, this section covers the phase in which the deterritorialization and reverse
territorialization of forests advanced.
For several years after the repeal of the Military Land Redistribution Program, occupied
forest area policies in Thailand headed in the opposite direction to that of the early 1990s. In
short, the government developed policies intended to change much forest area into agricultural
land reform areas or private lands. In addition, despite the fact that it had barely been
implemented, policies that would re-demarcate or downgrade some lands inside protected forest
areas were ordered or approved.
In conjunction with the drastic changes going on in the political regime, two noteworthy
political mechanisms related to occupied forest area policies occurred after 1992, with full-scale
democratization. First, a cabinet formed from elected politicians had to make the final decision
with respect to policy decisions. Related to this, some of the political parties were sensitive to
occupied forest area policy in the process of garnering votes. Second, farmers’ (or people’s)
organizations began to play a role in the politics of occupied forest area policy. Interestingly,
however, these political mechanisms developed two political structures, as we confirm in this
section and the next, structures that influenced the trends of occupied forest area policies. In
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this section, we follow a political structure that is indicated, mainly, by government motions
favoring the policy stance of farmers occupying forest areas, and by the massive participation of
occupying farmers in politics.
Agricultural Land Reform Progress and the First Chuan Government Policy
In July 1992, the Second Anan Caretaker Cabinet announced that it would cancel the
KJK. Nevertheless, motions aimed at retaining KJK-type policy persisted. The same
government approved “The Management Program for Natural Resource Protection” (khrongkan
catkan phua anurak saphayakon thamachat or Kho O Tho), to replace the KJK, at a cabinet
meeting on 28 July. Although this project was not supposed to adopt harsh enforcement
measures, the policy was fundamentally similar to the KJK in that it would relocate occupants,
especially if they were within certain areas [see nr 0202/16805 31/7/1992]. The Kho O Tho
was to be launched in fiscal 1993, and a 5-year MOAC (RFD) plan was formally adopted at a
cabinet meeting just before the September 1992 election [see nr 0203/19156 18/9/1992].
However, the cabinet that formed after the election never promoted this project, and the
committee responsible for it was officially disbanded in December 1992 [nr 0201/24823 17/12/
1992]. The Democrat Party, which won the election, pledged during the election campaign to
implement wide-ranging land reform policy [see Worapan et al. 1993: 62]. The party continued
to act on this pledge after forming a cabinet, and adopted land-reform policy that dealt with
some of the lands targeted by the former KJK and occupied lands inside other forest areas, but
not the Kho O Tho, which was similar to the KJK.
In its administrative policy speech, the Chuan Cabinet declared that it would initiate rapid
agricultural land reform [Phakdiphandungdan 2000: 369]. The Prime Minister mentioned an
ambitious target of 4 million rai per year; a target that constituted a campaign pledge in the
September 1992 election. Although this target was not realized, the first Chuan Cabinet
pioneered the promotion of agricultural land reform policies, at an unprecedented rate, during
the 1990s. In the 18 years from 1975–92, 170,000 ALRO certificates (SPK4–01) were awarded,
covering 3 million rai. By contrast, in the 7 years from 1993–99, 665,000 certificates were
issued for more than 11 million rai [see Chaimangkhara 1998; Thailand, So. Po. Ko. 1998; 1999].
With the policy change, national reserved forest areas became a target for land reform, and
the substantial territory governed as forests decreased significantly. Particularly targeted areas
were those forest areas categorized as “economic zones” in the March 1992 zoning resolu-
tion. Decisions made in cabinet meetings on March 30 and May 4, 1993, created a structure for
transferring the substantial management of these forest areas from the RFD to the ALRO, or
even the DOL.
The first resolution targeted STK areas and some former KJK areas [see nr 0203/4577 1/
4/1993]. The next resolution on May 4, 1993, targeted forest areas that were occupied, used,
and already considered devastated. Exceptions were made for forest areas protected by specific
acts or cabinet resolutions (e.g., national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and watersheds). The May
4, 1993, resolution also allowed land users to request title deeds under the Land Code if they
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had once received an ALRO certificate. Land titles could be requested if the land in question
had been possessed before the forest area designation date, as long as this could be verified
using aerial photos [see nr 0205/6360 10/5/1993].
The Farmers’ Movement and the Order for Re-demarcating Some Lands inside Protected Forest
Areas
With the policy resolutions discussed above, 37 million rai of economic forest zone were newly
transferred from the RFD to ALRO management by the end of 1993. Meanwhile, the
resolutions had little effect on forest areas protected by specific acts or cabinet resolutions,
despite the fact that numerous households subsisted within those territories.8) However, there
was a marked increase in requests for title deeds or agricultural land reform certificates, even in
specially protected forest areas, after 1993. The most outstanding development in this respect
was the mobilization of farmers’ movements, or the so-called “politics of agitation” [see
Phongpaichit and Backer 1997: 35].
Protest movements undertaken by farmers at relatively local levels, such as the anti-
eucalyptus movements in the northeast, were organized in the late 1980s. Although these local
protests contributed to the development of succeeding movements, the vanguard of the larger-
scale movements after the 1970s was the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast (So
Ko Yo Oo), which was established with the help of some NGOs in 1992. The organization
became actively involved in forest area problems, starting with the anti-KJK protests, and then
succeeded in drawing out some favorable responses from governments.
For instance, the So Ko Yo Oo (SKYO) organized two large demonstrations on the
Northeast-Bangkok Road, in 1993–94, to seek solutions to a number of controversial issues. In
the demonstrations, the farmers’ organization called on the Chuan government to re-examine
the boundaries of protected forest areas and to issue title deeds or ALRO certificates for
devastated forest areas in which many farmers were already living or in which villages were
already in existence [see PR 9/2/1994].
SKYO demonstrations had some positive results in 1994. The Chuan government agreed
that RFD officials and the SKYO could work jointly to survey and demarcate some forest
areas that were in question [see nr 0202/2163 16/2/1994]. In addition, Deputy Minister of
Agriculture Suthep, who had jurisdiction over the RFD, directed the RFD to inspect and register
people who occupied or made their living on lands inside national parks or wildlife sanctuaries,
and to re-demarcate such forest areas. Moreover, he even suggested that ALRO certificates be
issued to farmers in some lands [see Thailand, Kong Phengan 1994; PT 3/3/1994; ks 0100/3328
1/9/1994].
8) For instance, a 1995 report by an RFD officer estimated that a large number of households subsisted
inside watersheds, national parks, and wildlife sanctuaries in Thailand, i.e., 101,000, 58,000, and 23,000
households, respectively [see Keowkamnert 1995: 91, 108–130].
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The Occupying Farmers’ Offensive Continues and the Chavalit Government Opens Protected Forest
Areas
The farmers’ organization, which included occupying farmers, practiced the politics of agitation,
and the government agreed to some of the farmers’ demands after direct negotiations. Such a
pattern, as discussed in the last subsection, had emerged during the time in office of other
governments, as well as during the first Chuan administration. Particular attention should be
paid to the pattern in the 1997 Chavalit Cabinet in terms of the evolution of occupied forest area
policy, despite the fact that the farmers’ organization differed from the SKYO. In addition,
although it did not necessarily coincide with the pattern directly, a peculiar policy was instituted
around the same time as a result of the indirect influence of the farmers’ movements. We can
consider this policy as mediating the reverse territorialization of forests. However, this policy
became an adverse catalyst for policy re-introducing the functional territorialization of forests, as
we discuss below, because of its faulty content. In this subsection, we also examine this
peculiar policy.
The SKYO continued large-scale agitation in 1995. However, it temporarily relinquished its
role as an instigator in agitation politics after 1995. Instead, new SKYO splinter organizations
began to attract further attention by instigating agitation. In particular, the Assembly of the
Poor (SKJ) commanded attention from the media and academia, and had a marked impact on
protected forest area policy and other rural issues as a result of its actions.
The SKJ formed at the end of 1995, and began conducting protests around the Diet
Building in March 1996. The movement heated up markedly in 1997, when the organization
achieved its most significant results, during the Chavalit government. The Assembly of Isan
Farmers (So Do Tho) and the Northern Farmers Network (Kho Ko No), each of which had
organized separate protests with the SKYO, both joined the SKJ for a 1997 demonstration. At
its peak, about 20,000 people were involved in the protest [Pintobtang 1998: 55,70,159], and this
long-running demonstration (99 days) led to some concessions favoring farmers occupying
protected forest areas.
Resolutions announced on April 17 and 29, 1997, reflected the results of direct negotiations
between the SKJ and the government. These resolutions applied mainly to certain northern
protected forests. Important points were as follows. If it were proved that a person (his or her
family) had been residing and/or making a living in an area of land before it became a
protected forest, that person was guaranteed a “stable right” (sitthi mankong) to reside and/or
make a living there. This right could be transferred by inheritance only to heirs; the right could
not be sold to others. Claims could be verified using So Kho 1 and Pho Bo Tho 5 documents, a
copy of a resident register, the presence of fruit trees, or witness statements [see nr 0205/5451
17/4/1997; nr 0205/6125 1/5/1997; PR 6/4/1998; Samacha Khon Jon 1998: 26–32].
In addition to these resolutions, based on direct negotiations, the same Chavalit Cabinet
approved another resolution, submitted by the MOAC, at around the same time. As the April 17
and 29 resolutions applied only in some cases, the authorities needed to prepare a policy
resolution for the whole country immediately. Oddly, this policy resolution had little conformity
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with the resolutions based on direct negotiations, in terms of its content. In addition, it was a
rather slipshod resolution, as discussed below. Despite its defects, the policy resolution aimed
to resolve occupied land issues inside protected forest areas, without considering large-scale
relocation of the occupants. Furthermore, this policy can be regarded as characteristic of a
reverse territorialization policy in relation to forests, given that, once implemented, it
downgraded many lands inside protected forest areas to those of national reserved forest areas.
The so-called Wannamkiao Resolution of April 22, 1997 focused on occupied forest area
problems nationwide, including, in particular, those forest areas protected by acts or cabinet
resolutions. First, the resolution stated that Land Code title deeds were not to be issued for
protected forest areas. However, the resolution went on to guarantee the rights of people who
resided and/or made a living in protected forest areas. Details were to be worked out in the
National Reserved Forests Act. That is, if occupied land was situated inside national parks or
wildlife sanctuaries, boundaries would be examined, and the status of this land in a protected
forest area could be changed to that of a national reserved forest area. If occupied land
was situated inside Class 1 or Class 2 watersheds, then the class designations could be
downgraded. Furthermore, the April 22 resolution also considered the issuance of special STK
land certificates, following a specified procedure [see nr 0205/5859 29/4/1997].
V Partial Further Functional Territorialization Policy in the Late 1990s
and Confrontation under the Democratic Polity
In the last section (Section IV), we presented examples of the government ordering or
approving the deterritorialization or reverse territorialization of forests. Nevertheless,
throughout the 1990s, the re-demarcation of lands that were inside protected forest areas
seemed to have been barely implemented [see Thernmongkol 2000].
Two main factors were responsible for this. Both trends developed under a democratic
political regime, although neither was a product of a drastic transition in the general political
situation, unlike examples presented in sections III and IV. First, alternating governments
involving different parties prevented the implementation of the re-demarcation. For instance,
with the change of government, the authority smothered the agreements between the first
Chuan administration and the SKYO.9) Second, the 1997 April policies were cancelled in 1998,
and then the government newly approved a functional territorialization policy, a policy that we
can call the partial further functional territorialization of forests. In this section, we follow the
evolution of occupied forest area policy in the late 1990s, focusing on the phase before and after
the 1998 policy.
In this phase, two actions by stakeholders related to occupied forest area policies should be
noted. First, different farmers’ organizations and NGOs emerged as major players in the politics
of occupied forest areas, and they wanted to revoke the policies favoring occupying farmers
9) Based on an interview with a former officer of the SKYO.
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inside protected forest areas. Second, the government, led by the same political party that had
permitted the transfer of protected forest areas to agricultural land reform areas only a few
years earlier, adopted the opposite policy stance. These actions on the part of the actors
suggest that a different political structure from the one confirmed in Section IV also developed
under the same democratic political regime.
Protests by Protection Advocate Groups in Response to Policies Opening Protected Forest Areas
The April 1997 resolutions are often referred to as a set, because they were proclaimed within a
short period. However, closer examination reveals a number of differences in how the
resolutions treated protected forest area problems. The April 17 resolution distinctly specified
the categories of forest area users who were permitted to obtain land rights. The April 22
resolution did not contain a similar description. While the April 29 resolution defined a number
of methods for verifying farmers’ land use claims, the April 22 resolution contained no reference
to verification procedures.
These regulatory loopholes in the April 22 resolution provoked outcries from various
private organizations, including the SKJ and related organizations [see PR 2/4/1998; KT 29/4/
1997]. Notably, two other protest groups emerged, each characterized by distinct opposition
methods. These groups opposed the April 22, 1997 resolution (or all of the April 1997
resolutions) because of loopholes in the resolution, and because of the policies that opened
protected forest areas.
The first group, labeled protectionist NGOs (ongkon phatthana ekachon dan anurak) by the
media, presented written petitions to the government and voiced opposition to the April 22,
1997 resolution (or all of the April 1997 resolutions) through media outlets. After April 1997 this
group repeatedly demanded that the government re-examine the resolution (or the resolutions)
[see PR 13/5/1997; PR, KT 26/6/1997; PR 26–27/7/1997; Matichon 18/2/1998; 2/4/1998]. The
second group took their protests around the forest area directly. This group consisted primarily
of lowland farmers from Chiang Mai Province in northern Thailand. In April and May 1998, the
group organized highway blockades around the most famous national park in Thailand, with the
help of thousands of protesters, and appealed for revocation of the April 1997 resolutions [BP
28/4/1998; Matichon 28/5/1998; Nation 2/7/1998].
It is not clear at what point some NGOs in Thailand were first described as “protectionist”
or simply as protection groups. This appellation often appeared in the Community Forests Act
controversy, to which some NGOs were more actively committed than others. There have been
many twists and turns over the past decade, but two relatively clear NGO positions emerged
during the course of the controversy. One group would allow the creation of official community
forest establishments, under certain conditions, even inside protected areas. This group
consisted mainly of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs). The other group
opposed such establishments inside protected areas, in principle, and was made up mainly of
protectionist NGOs. The protests of the protection groups, regarding the April 22, 1997
resolution (or all of the April 1997 resolutions) seemed to be linked to the evolution of the
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Community Forests Act.
The core of the second group was the Chom Thong Watershed and Environment
Conservation Club, which consisted mainly of lowland orchard and rice farmers. They had
requested that the government remove upstream “hill people” from the watershed area in the
late 1980s [see Watershed 4(1) 1998: 19–22]. Competition over water resources probably
sparked the dispute, but the resolutions of the Chavalit government, which opened protected
forest areas, fueled the conflict.
Protests by Protection Advocate Groups, Turnabout of the Chuan Government, and Policy
Defending Protected Forest Areas
Although some protests occurred soon after the April 1997 resolutions, further action was taken
under the second Chuan government, which had taken over from the Chavalit Cabinet.
Controversy over forest fires that erupted in the 1997–98 dry season was linked to criticism of
the 1997 resolutions. El Niño weather patterns may have helped fuel some of the fires, which
caused far-reaching damage. However, some Thais blamed the 1997 resolutions for their
country’s fires. For example, in April 1998, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Newin, a
government representative at “The Public Stage,” told a newspaper reporter that the last fire
season differed from those in previous years. Most of the forest fires, he claimed, were set on
purpose by people trying to get land-use rights [Thairat 6/4/1998]. This claim was difficult to
prove.10) However, the statement suggested a change in government policy. Already, the
MOAC was preparing for cabinet re-consideration of the 1997 policies [ibid.].
In June 1998, the second Chuan government approved a new policy resolution that
reversed key content items of the 1997 resolutions. First, it made the conditions under which
protected forest area users could claim residence and/or farming inside such areas much more
rigorous. The new resolution altered the wording to require continuous utilization, and
use from a date before the forest area reservation by first act. The “first act” could almost be
considered the National Reserved Forests Act.11) The national reserved forest designations were
implemented much earlier than the protected forest designations, although both designations
overlap in most cases. Next, the 1998 June resolution amended the verification methods, in
that verification relied on aerial photos (or satellite photos). Furthermore, even if these
requirements were met, if lands were considered “endangered areas” (phunthi lolem; i.e., part of
endangered ecological systems) or critical areas for the effective management of protected
forests, the resolution allowed government officials to consider relocation to other areas [see
nr 0205/8113 10/7/1998].
The program “The Public Stage,” in 2000, highlighted the intense debate over the 1998
June resolution among stakeholders. The following two aspects of the stage performance
should be considered as highlighting the political structure of the policy change leading to the
10) The Kho Ko No suggested an alternative cause for the forest fires; they suggested that the RFD was
using forest fires to divert attention from the RFD scandal [see PR 2/4/1998; 3/4/1998].
11) Refer to a statement made by the Director General of the RFD in “The Public Stage.”
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1998 June resolution. First, the RFD brought up the opposition of protection groups to the 1997
April resolutions, and had a northern lowland farmers’ organization sitting on the same
side. The second point was the seating position of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the
intense debate.
The Director General of the RFD explained why the April 17 and 29, 1997 resolutions had
also been revoked and amended, and not only the April 22 resolution. First, he emphasized that
those resolutions had originally been designed to deal with individual cases. Therefore, a more
comprehensive (and less defective) policy was needed. Citing content, he noted that the phrase
“stable right” (sitthi mankong) is not a true legal term and that the verification method that
relied on witness testimony was too problematic. In addition, he referred to the opposition of
protection groups to the April 1997 resolutions and stated that the government must also listen
to the requests of these groups.
The explanation that the RFD gave for adopting the June 1998 resolution on the stage
consisted almost entirely of superficial or technical terms. More interestingly, the Director
General barely referred to why the core content had been revised, or why they had revised the
policy so far toward not revoking protected area status, apart from pointing to the opposition of
protection groups to the 1997 resolutions. Therefore, in the June 1998 resolution, and the
subsequent “Public Stage” broadcast, the existence of protection groups had a very important
effect on occupied forest area politics. In short, the opposition of protection groups gave added
legitimacy to the 1998 policy revision, an expedient revision for the RFD, and to the ongoing
policy controversy under the democratic polity.
Second, the seating position of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Second Chuan
Cabinet, in the debate involving the side claiming to defend the protected forest areas, captured
our interest because the position suggested a different policy stance for the second Chuan
government, as compared to their initial stance. The same cabinet, led by the Democrat Party
(DEM), swerved towards policy change, after they had previously promoted agricultural land
reform policies, and the former deputy minister had even ordered the re-demarcation of some
protected forest areas.
As an added brief explanation of the factors contributing to such change, the following
points should be noted: as a newspaper editorial suggested [see BP 2/7/1998], power struggles
with other political parties probably influenced the DEM Cabinet policy change. Originally, the
Chuan DEM had used the Land Reform policy to their benefit in the election [see Munithi Lok
Si Khiao 1997: 161]. However, the political practices of the DEM, and its rivals, including the
Chavalit New Aspiration Party (NAP), were similar. The latter party, which consisted almost
entirely of congressional representatives from the northeast, including the largest rural part of
Thailand, held a stronger position on this practice. Although the DEM and NAP cooperated to
form the first Chuan coalition government, they subsequently became the two largest parties
and competed after the 1996 general election. The parties had contrasting election results: the
DEM captured 29 of the 37 seats in Bangkok versus 1 for the NAP, while the NAP captured 78
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of the 137 seats in the northeast versus 12 for the DEM.12) This inner structure of the DEM,
together with the serious economic crisis of 1997, might have influenced some of the policy
directions of the Second Chuan Cabinet, such as the anti-populist policies toward some farmers’
and people’s organizations.
VI Concluding Remarks
In a previous study, Vandergeest presented the historical process of “territorialization” with
respect to forests in Thailand, emphasizing that the process took place in three stages
[Vandergeest 1996]. Using the concept “territorialization,” and showing the process, he focused
on how the government had used increasingly intricate territorial strategies to claim resources
and control human activities in that part of the national territory defined as forest. By contrast,
we examined not only the territorialization of forests but also the processes that the
territorialization of forests deconstructed and turned back (or tried to). We called these
processes the deterritorialization and reverse territorialization of forests. In addition to these
processes, we emphasized aspects of the adjustment policy for Thai occupied forest areas in the
1990s, especially those points when policy evolution dynamically traversed two conflicting policy
directions. Furthermore, by emphasizing this, we suggested that Thai governments had
promoted not only the territorialization of forests but also the deterritorialization and reverse
territorialization of forests (or tried to). In short, Thai governments had bidirectional stances
with regard to occupied forest area policy, most notably in the 1990s.
Even in the evolution of occupied forest area policy before the 1990s, there was conflict
between the territorialization and deterritorialization of forests. For instance, the 1985 February
resolution itself, and the development before and after the resolution, represented such a
conflict. However, those conflicts were no match for the policies and policy evolution of the
1990s in terms of the dynamics, scale, and controversial nature of their evolution. The profile of
occupied forest area policy throughout the 1990s can be summarized as follows. The policies in
the 1990s originated with the KJK and zoning, which constituted the largest-ever attempt at a
functional territorialization of forests in Thailand. This passed through a stage leading to the
deterritorialization and reverse territorialization of forests, on an unprecedented scale, with
resolutions and orders enacted from 1992 to 1997. Then, policies changed back toward the
partial further functional territorialization of forests with the 1998 resolution. Moreover, the
June 1998 resolution has held, not only up to the time of “The Public Stage” in 2000 but also up
to 2004.
Why did this policy evolution emerge in the 1990s? In this study, we have presented the
background behind policy evolution in the 1990s by pointing to shifts in the political structures
related to occupied forest area policy. Specifically, these shifts were suggested by a number of
changes, highlighted by the composition of the actors involved, the power relationships among
12) In the two elections before 1996, the DEM won 7 seats in Bangkok and 14 in the northeast in 1995,
and 9 and 17, respectively, in September 1992.
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these actors, and the actors’ stances in relation to each policy.
Certain political elites argued for opposing policy directions during the 1980s, a period that
included the “half democracy” regime. Nevertheless, the re-establishment of absolute political
power by the military and its participation in the politics of occupied forest area policy made the
approval and implementation of the largest-ever functional territorialization policy possible.
Soon afterwards, another huge change in the Thai general political regime emerged: the
political power of the military ended and a democratic political regime began to take hold. In
tandem with this change, the political mechanism producing Thai occupied forest area policy
altered significantly. The elected governments had real power when it came to policy decisions,
and some political parties promoted particular polices to garner votes. Furthermore, some
private organizations, such as farmers’ organizations and NGOs, became involved in the politics
of occupied forest area policy, and exerted pressure on the government using agitation and
other means. Interestingly, however, these transformations, in tandem with democratization
after 1992, became the source of two conflicting policy trends, leading to the development of
actual political structures, which then affected policy. The shift in political structure that
influenced occupied forest area policy after democratization was initially symbolized by
the massive participation of occupying farmers in politics and by the policy stance of
some governments toward the deterritorialization and reverse territorialization of forests.
Subsequently, this shift came to be symbolized by the participation of other private
organizations supporting protectionist policies, and by the government policy change toward the
re-functional territorialization of protected forests in 1998.
In addition to these noteworthy aspects pertaining to the evolution of policy and politics in
relation to Thai occupied forest areas in the 1990s, we confirm the fundamental principles
associated with the most notable aspect that emerged under democratization in this
decade. The 1990s saw two different political regimes operating in Thailand: the military regime
or the regime strongly controlled by the military power (1990–92) and a democratic regime
(1992–). The most notable aspect of the policy evolution related to Thai occupied forest areas
after 1992 is that conflicting policy trends still appeared under a democratic political
regime. These conflicting policy trends involved the trend toward the deterritorialization and
reverse territorialization of forests and the trend toward the re-functional territorialization of
protected forests. Two fundamental principles are connected with this notable aspect. One is
that suggested by the emergence of conflicting policy trends within the one political regime,
and the other is that suggested by the political structures behind the emergence of these
conflicting trends.
First, the emergence of conflicting policy trends shows that the democratic political regime,
in itself, does not necessarily regulate the trends in Thai occupied forest area policy, nor does it
guarantee a particular position. For instance, after 1992, the development of a parliamentary
cabinet regime based on elections, and the progress made in politics by private organizations,
led to policy changes in two opposing directions. Second, the political structures behind the
emergence of these conflicting policy trends suggest that the politics concerned with occupied
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forest areas under a democratic political regime evolved structures of competition and conflict
that are consistent with the political regime, in response to policy evolution. In short, we
confirm that a structure of confrontation, such as that among private organizations or powerful
political parties, played a major role in the emergence of opposing policy trends. These
principles persisted in 2000, as evidenced by “The Public Stage,” and still persist even today
(December, 2004).
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